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Abstract
This paper asks what factors influence the maturity choice of private
mortgage borrowers and if the choice is rational. Using a unique data
set from the German market with more than 50,000 financed projects, we
find a significant influence of personal and macroeconomic factors. A high
income, a low loan value, and a low value to income ratio lead to short
maturities; so do economically good times with high GDP growth and
low unemployment. In addition, we show that the importance of pricing
variables is age dependent and declining for older borrowers. Moreover,
we demonstrate that borrowers behave irrational and not according to the
recommendations of models on optimal mortgage choice when choosing the
maturity of their mortgage.
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1 Introduction
In household finance, the mortgage decision is one of the most interesting topics
because it usually is the largest single financial decision a household takes. A
mortgage is associated with certain risks that can be threatening to the welfare
of a household. In particular, mortgages with an adjustable interest rate can
result in excessive payments when the interest level has risen. In order to study
who is especially prone to the interest rate risk, this paper investigates the deter-
minants of the maturity choice of private mortgage borrowers. What influence
do pricing variables have? Do personal and macroeconomic variables matter? Is
the borrowers’ behavior in line with the results of models on optimal mortgage
choice? This paper makes a further step in answering these questions.
So far most studies have focused on the United States where borrowers can
choose between adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs).
As FRMs usually have a maturity of 30 years, the downside risk of interest
changes is negligible. This is different for ARMs which have periods of fixed
interest rates of up to 5 years1. All studies agree in the importance of pricing
variables. By contrast, the influence of personal traits is highly controversial.
Most studies such as Dhillon et al. (1987) or Brueckner and Follain (1988) find
no or only very weak significance for borrower specific variables. Nevertheless,
Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) point out that ARMs must be treated as differ-
entiated products since there exists a difference whether the magnitude of the
payment is readjusted every six months or every five years only. We conduct
the first study where the exact length of the period of fixed interest rate up to
15 years is known. This allows an in-depth investigation of the drivers for the
maturity decision and verifies the importance of personal variables.
1Cf. Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995).
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We use a unique data set from a large German direct bank containing 52,148
projects that were financed between January 2005 and July 2010. Since the data
was taken directly from the bank’s database, it is of a very high quality. We
have information on the mortgage such as the interest rate, the loan value, or
the maturity and information on the borrower such as age, occupation, marital
status, or income. Furthermore, we have detailed insights into the calculation of
the interest rate and can consequently control for several premiums. Particularly,
we do not only know the interest rate that the borrower has to pay for the chosen
maturity but also the interest rates that she would have paid for other maturities.
An important feature of our dataset is that the borrowers’ characteristics are not
used for interest rate adjustments. We can hence observe the unbiased influence of
personal variables on the mortgage decision while usually the bank’s anticipation
influences the pricing of the mortgage causing a modified maturity choice. We
comment on this in more detail in section 4. In addition, we use data from the
German Bundesbank for macroeconomic data.
Since we want to identify the influence of various variables on the chosen ma-
turity, we use maturity as dependent variable and regress it on pricing, personal,
and macroeconomic variables. In the literature, logit or probit models have been
used to distinguish between ARMs and FRMs. As our dependent variable can
assume numerous values, we run an OLS regression. Hence, we can for the first
time also estimate the economic influence of the explanatory variables. As a
robustness check, we use an ordered logit model with the three most popular
maturities.
Thanks to the large and detailed data set we can show which personal vari-
ables matter. We find that borrowers with a smaller income and higher loan
values prefer longer maturities. The same is true for younger and first-time bor-
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rowers. Non-German borrowers prefer shorter maturities. Furthermore, we can
show that the macroeconomic situation has a significant influence on the mort-
gage decision. In economically good times – characterized by high GDP growth
and low unemployment –, borrowers reduce the maturity of their mortgage even
though they should expect interest rate increases and therefore save the current
interest level for longer.
We compare the actual behavior of borrowers with the recommendations of
Campbell and Cocco (2003). We find that, on average, people act in contradiction
to the results of their life-cycle model. While households with large houses relative
to their income, volatile labor income and single borrowers should prefer a reduced
interest rate risk, they actually choose shorter maturities. The only exception is
risk aversion. We find – in line with Campbell and Cocco (2003) – that high risk
aversion results in longer maturities. In addition, we have a closer look at the
unquestioned influence of pricing variables. We find that their impact is high on
younger borrowers and steadily declining for older borrowers. Finally, we confirm
the influence of the household decision rule proposed by Koijen et al. (2009).
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first study
to investigate the mortgage market of Germany which is the largest economy in
the European Union. Second, we use a detailed and thus far largest data set and
hence overcome the concerns of Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) who state that “a
major constraint on the mortgage literature is that large, detailed data sets are
not available.” (p. 500) Third, since we are not restricted to the decision between
ARMs and FRMs, we can use the actual maturity and treat the mortgages as
differentiated products. Fourth and most importantly, this exceptional data set
allows answering new questions. We investigate the influence of the macroeco-
nomic situation and the influence of the borrower’s age on the importance of
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pricing variables. In addition, we are the first to verify the predictions of the
model in Campbell and Cocco (2003) explicitly. We can hence test whether the
decisions of mortgage borrowers are reasonable.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the literature on the empirical
and optimal choice between different maturities is presented. Section 3 contains
a description of German mortgage market. The dataset is presented in section 4.
After the presentation of the models in section 5, section 6 discusses the empirical
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
In his Presidential Address to the American Finance Association, John Campbell
said that “there has been surprisingly little work on mortgage decisions from the
perspective of the household.” (Campbell (2006), p. 1577) This is especially true
for studies on optimal mortgage choice. The first investigation about whether
certain characteristics of a household should lead to a preference for either an
ARM or a FRM was conducted by Campbell and Cocco (2003). They solve
a life-cycle model and account for both income risk and interest-rate risk and
find that couples should prefer ARMs. As aforementioned, the same is true for
“households with smaller houses relative to income, more stable income, lower
risk aversion, more lenient treatment in bankruptcy, and a higher probability of
moving” (p. 1489).
Van Hemert et al. (2005) investigate mortgage choice with simultaneous con-
sideration of the optimal financial portfolio in a continuous-time model with
CRRA preferences. This study differs from Campbell and Cocco (2003) by ne-
glecting income risk but including wealth risk in a more complex way. It con-
centrates on the influence of risk aversion and finds that a borrower with a low
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risk aversion should prefer an ARM whereas a borrower with a higher risk aver-
sion should choose an FRM. In a life-cycle model that also includes the housing
tenure and house size choice, Van Hemert (2009) finds that only older, risk-averse
borrowers should hold FRMs.
While there are few papers showing what borrowers should do, there are quite
a number of research projects on the question what parameters do influence the
decision between FRMs and ARMs. However, most of the studies could not find
a significant influence of personal factors as the literature on optimal mortgage
choice predicts.
The first examination of the influence of price and borrower variables was
conducted by Dhillon et al. (1987) using a single-city data set with 78 observa-
tions. They find a prevalent impact of the pricing and only a weak impact of the
borrower characteristics. In detail, households with co-borrowers, married cou-
ples, and short expected housing tenures as well as wealthier borrowers tend to
prefer ARMs. The t-value of all these variables is relatively low so that only the
mobility variable is significant on a 10% level. The influence of age, education,
first-time home buying, and self-employment is insignificant. Brueckner and Fol-
lain (1988) use 475 observations from a national broker survey. They also show
the high impact of pricing factors. A high spread between the initial interest rates
of ARMs and FRMs and a high rate for FRMs increase the probability of taking
an ARM. So does a high borrower income and the fact that someone is new to
the respective metropolitan area. However, one has to note that the significance
of these variables is rather low. The other characteristics – i.e. whether there are
children in the household, the borrower age, and the fact that the borrower is a
repeat homebuyer – have no significant impact at all.
A considerably larger data set was used by Tucker (1989). It contains 20,697
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mortgages from a fifty-month period. Once again, the impact of the spread
between ARM and FRM interest rates is found. Furthermore, a rising CPI and
lower T-bill rates lead to a higher probability of an ARM choice. The significance
of the offered FRM interest rate cannot be replicated. Phillips and VanderHoff
(1991) split the ARM-FRM-spread into the temporary ARM rate reduction and
the fully adjusted ARM interest rate. An increase in both components signif-
icantly raises the probability of choosing an ARM, as does an increase of the
spread between ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds and one-year Treasury bill yields
and an increase of house prices. Once again, the personal characteristics mobility,
whether the borrower is a repeat homebuyer, and whether there are children in
the household have no significant influence. For this study, 755 mortgages from
a three-year period are used.
A sample of 6,818 observations is used by Phillips and VanderHoff (1994).
This study confirms the findings for the ARM-FRM-spread. A further result is
that households with a high ratio of mortgage loan to house value and households
in a region with high income growth per capita prefer ARMs. The borrower
characteristics income, reported assets, and reported debts have no impact. So
far the only study to account for the frequency of interest rate adjustment is Sa-
Aadu and Sirmans (1995). The frequency ranges from semiannual to every five
years. In this respect, this study comes closest to ours. However, there are only
345 mortgage loans from a six-year period in the data set. In line with previous
findings, short adjustment periods are influenced strongest by a relative increase
of the mortgage’s price. Households that have lived less than two years at the
current address, that are younger, and that expect their income to rise prefer
ARMs. By contrast, the current income and the liquid assets of the borrower are
not significant.
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The first study that uses non-US data is Duffy and Roche (2005) analyzing
36,810 loans from the largest mortgage provider in the Republic of Ireland. The
borrowers can choose between standard ARMs, 1 year discounted ARMs and
FRMs with maturities from 1 to 5 years. The authors find that the higher the
ARM-FRM-spread, the higher the probability for an ARM. Both a higher loan to
value ratio, a higher house price to income ratio, and the use of mortgage brokers
increase the probability for the one year fixed rate mortgage. Households that
are first-time buyers and those with a co-borrower prefer FRMs. By contrast,
a male borrower tends to choose an ARM. The ARM-FRM-spread has a bigger
impact on first-time than on repeat homebuyers. An emphasis on the employment
sector of the borrower is placed by Cutts et al. (2006). They find that households
working in stable sectors prefer FRMs. Furthermore, households with high debt,
young college graduates, and self-employed people prefer ARMs. Once again, the
relative price of ARMs and FRMs influences the decision as well. The data for
this study was taken from five survey years (1989 through 2001) of the Survey of
Consumer Finances.
Paiella and Pozzolo (2007) conduct a study for Italy, using 421 mortgages
reported in the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth. They
find that households facing a low variable interest rate or a high ARM-FRM-
spread prefer ARMs. Borrower characteristics have a minor influence. Older
borrowers and borrowers with children prefer FRMs (on a 5% significance level).
The type of employment, income, and wealth have no significant impact on the
decision. The stronger the competition in the local bank market, the higher the
probability of taking on ARMs. Analyzing 1,367 loans from a Korean survey from
2004 to 2006, Shin (2008) cannot find a significant influence of age and household
size.
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In a nutshell, the present empirical literature has not been able to identify
certain personal characteristics that influence mortgage choice.
3 The German Mortgage Market
Our analysis is applied to the housing market in Germany. This market differs
from the mortgage market in the United States in some respects; however, we
think that the German market is especially appropriate for our research.
First, mortgages in Germany are with recourse, i.e. German mortgage bor-
rowers usually guarantee with their entire assets and not with the hypothecated
house only. This lowers the degree of speculation and hence reveals the maturity
preferences better.
Second, the maturity decision is not based on ARM vs. FRM – instead,
borrowers can choose how long the interest rate is to be fixed. This can be any
maturity and 10 years is most popular. When the fixed interest period is over,
the remaining mortgage amount must be refinanced at the current interest rate.
It is also possible to fix the interest rates to an earlier point of time by using a
forward mortgage. Hence, the borrowers have a high freedom of choice and can
opt for the maturity that fits best. The German markets allows to overcome the
limitations of a decision with only two alternatives.
Third, there is a prepayment penalty when the mortgage has a maturity of
less than 10.5 years.2 This means that the borrower is only allowed to redeem
the mortgage before maturity when he or she compensates the bank for incurred
losses of interest payments. Therefore, lower interest rates do not cause mortgage
refinancing. After 10 years, the mortgage can be called by the borrower with a
time limit of half a year. For mortgages with longer maturities, the value of the
2The bank that provided our data set only charges a penalty fee if the yearly prepayment
exceeds 5% of the original amount.
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prepayment option usually is not included in the interest rates which exposes
mortgage providers to a prepayment risk for mortgages with long maturities.
Consequently, the maturity spread tends to be smaller than in the United States.
Fourth, equity extraction is not possible. This guarantees that the mort-
gage is used for real estate financing only. Fifth, interest payments are only tax
deductible when the house is rented.
There are two common ways for taking out a mortgage: Borrowers can either
approach one or several banks and request a loan offer, or they can contact a
mortgage broker who compares the offers of a larger number of banks. Since the
broker is paid by the mortgage provider and this payment might depend on the
maturity, we control for the influence of brokers in the following.
Mortgages provided by banks to individuals amount to more than one trillion
Euros. In contrast to the USA, the market share of both variable and 30-year
mortgages is low. In 2009, according to data from the German Bundesbank about
17% of the issued mortgages were floating or had a maturity of less than one year.
In this figure, interim financing is included. We have no interim financing in the
data set because it does not reflect a deliberate decision. The share of mortgages
with a maturity of more than 10 years amounted to about 25%.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a unique dataset from a large German mortgage provider acting both
via direct marketing and mortgage brokers. It contains 88,774 single mortgages
originated between January 2005 and July 2010. However, it is not uncommon
to take out several loans at once which allows more flexibility in redeeming the
loans. As a consequence, the number of unique borrowers is reduced to 69,384.
We totalize mortgage sizes and monthly repayments and take weighted arithmetic
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means of the interest rate, the repayment rate, and the maturity.
Furthermore, we remove some of the data. Most importantly, we delete all
forward mortgages. The bank that provided our data set allows to settle the
new conditions up to three years beforehand. Having no information about this
time span, we decided to remove the 16,834 forward mortgages. Furthermore,
we remove 72 mortgages from a temporary special offer with maturities of more
than 15 years. Last but not least, we also remove 330 mortgages where some
information is missing; 52,148 mortgages remain. For the ordered logit model,
we use mortgages with a maturity of 5, 10, or 15 years only; 43,297 mortgages
remain.
A major advantage of our dataset is that the bank does not use the infor-
mation on the borrower for pricing. In perfect and complete financial markets,
the borrower characteristics would be reflected in the pricing and other terms of
the mortgage. Consequently, if banks know that certain borrowers prefer specific
maturities they can adjust the interest rate in order to induce them to choose a
maturity that is more profitable for the bank. In the end, we cannot observe the
exogenous behavior of the borrower. In our dataset, however, the bank’s interest
rate is independent of information on the borrower for business model reasons.
It depends only on the size of the mortgage (smaller mortgages are more expen-
sive) and the loan to value ratio (higher loan to value ratios are more expensive).
Depending on these parameters, the bank’s offer is determined. If the potential
borrower is interested, she can apply for the mortgage. In the last step, the bank
calculates a creditworthiness score. Based on this score, the mortgage applica-
tion is accepted or rejected. Importantly, there are no risk premiums added to
the interest rates. We hence do not suffer from a maturity distortion caused by
personal variables and can observe their true impact. This might explain why we
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find a significant influence whereas earlier research could not.
We have no information on further relationships between the bank and the
customer. However, since the majority of the mortgages is arranged by mortgage
brokers and information on the borrower is not used for pricing, we consider
relationship aspects negligible.
The macroeconomic data and interest rates for government bonds were taken
from the website of the German Bundesbank. We can use GDP growth on a
quarterly basis and the unemployment rate as well as the inflation rate on a
monthly basis. The data of the Ifo Business Climate Index was taken from the
website of the Ifo Institute. This think tank asks German companies about their
current business situation and their business expectations in order to calculate
the index on a monthly basis.
The general interest level is the interest rate charged for a mortgage with a
notional value of EUR 100,000, a maturity of 10 years, and a loan to value ratio of
60%. The spread denotes the interest rate difference of mortgages with a maturity
of fifteen and five years and the same size and loan to value ratio. Consequently,
both figures depend only on the origination day and are independent of the
maturity of the respective loan.
The house price to income ratio is calculated as collateral value divided by
twelve times the reported monthly income. Stable Income covers borrowers who
are civil servants or retired persons, i.e. people whose income is paid by the
government and who cannot be laid off. Instable Income covers borrowers who
are self-employed persons and freelancers.
We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the vari-
able has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
Descriptive statistics are given in table 1. The chosen maturity varies between
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one year and fifteen years which is the maximum maturity offered by the mortgage
provider in order to limit the prepayment risk (cf. section 3). The average
maturity is 11 years. The average mortgage amounts to EUR 165,000 but we can
observe a high standard deviation due to very low and very high mortgage sizes.
Only 20% of the mortgages in our dataset were directly taken out at the bank
whereas 80% were taken out after the consultation of an independent mortgage
broker. Mortgage brokers compare the conditions of a large number of national
and local operating banks. They are usually paid a commission by the chosen
bank and do not charge the mortgage borrower any fees.
[Insert table 1 here]
5 Model Specification
The chosen maturity ranges from one to fifteen years. It is therefore plausible to
run an OLS regression. The model is in the form Maturityi = α+γiβ1 +λiβ2 +εi
where γi is the vector of explanatory variables depending on model specifications,
λi is the vector of control variables and εi is the error term. Control variables
depend on the model specifications and can include, for example, interaction
terms and year fixed effects.
Since approximately five out of six loans have a maturity of either five, ten, or
fifteen years, we also run an ordered-logit regression in a second step. Compared
to a standard logit probability specification, the dependent variable yi can assume
more than two values. Here we assume yi ∈ {5, 10, 15}. Then P(yi = j) =
P(αj−5 < γiβ1 + λiβ2 + εi ≤ αj) where α0 = −∞ and α15 =∞.
We demean the variables used in interaction terms except for dummy vari-
ables. This is a common approach dealing with interaction terms and eases the
interpretation of the regressors.
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6 Results
6.1 Influence of personal traits
In contrast to the literature, we find a clear and significant influence of personal
traits of the borrower on the maturity decision. Column (a) in table 2 shows
that borrowers with a higher income choose shorter maturities whereas a higher
loan value results in longer maturities. This might be due to financial constraints.
Borrowers with a low income and a large mortgage cannot bear the risk of interest
rate increases. Therefore, they prefer not to have an adjustment soon. This is in
line with the influence of the loan to value ratio: The smaller the equity share
the longer the maturity of the mortgage. Interestingly, this influence depends
on the income of the borrowers. In table 3 we show that the loan to value ratio
has no significant influence for borrowers with an income of less than EUR 2,500
and an increasing influence with rising income. This indicates that less wealthy
borrowers cannot afford to increase the maturity of their loan when having a high
loan to value ratio.
[Insert table 2 here]
[Insert table 3 here]
When borrowers refinance their mortgage they choose a maturity that is on
average about 0.6 years shorter than the mortgages of borrowers who take out a
loan for the first time. Borrowers who did well with their first mortgage might
be more willing to take on a higher interest rate risk. In addition, recalling the
steadily falling interest rates over the last decades, they also might want to react
to interest rate changes faster.
Foreigners usually choose shorter maturities by about 0.7 years. Since we
have no information about their provenience, there are two possible explanations:
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First, these borrowers come from countries where ARMs or mortgages with short
periods of fixed interest rates are more common. Thus, they prefer this kind
of loans in Germany as well. Second, Germans are more risk averse than other
nationalities and therefore want to fix their repayments for a longer time.
The number of children in a household increases the maturity slightly. How-
ever, the economic significance is low. When using squared age as additional
explanatory variable, the number of children also loses statistical significance.
Therefore, the impact of this variable is not definite.
When the borrowers are not going to live in the financed real estate them-
selves, the maturity of the mortgage is reduced. Financing an owner-occupied
house might lead to a higher risk aversion since a foreclosure does not only mean
the loss of a financial asset but of one’s home.
Older borrowers choose shorter maturities than younger ones. A ten year
difference in age results on average in a 0.4 year difference in maturity. In column
(c) of table 2 we show that age has a quadratic impact. There, the linear term has
a positive sign. However, the combination of the linear and quadratic term has a
negative influence for all borrowers older than 28 years. The effect consequently
is especially pronounced for relatively old borrowers.
As column (b) in table 2 shows, controlling for year-fixed effects does not
change any result notably. We also control for the influence of a mortgage broker.
Using a mortgage broker leads to longer maturities. We cannot exclude the
explanation that other banks pay higher commissions for mortgages with shorter
maturities than our dataset provider. Therefore, no meaningful interpretation is
possible and we decided to treat this variable as a control.
Furthermore, we control for some interaction terms. As a consequence of the
amortization payments, the loan to value ratio is lower for mortgages that are
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renewed. In order to get the influence of the loan to value ratio for a first-time
mortgage, we use this interaction term. Because of tax considerations the loan to
value ratio might be higher for not owner-occupied real estate. Therefore, we also
control for the interaction of loan to value ratio and owner occupation. Last but
not least, we control for the interaction of loan value and income since borrowers
with a higher income can afford large loans.
Using the ordered logit model whose results are shown in table 4, we do not
find major differences. The only notable deviation is the loss of significance of
the loan to value ratio when controlling for year fixed effects.
[Insert table 4 here]
Wooldridge (2002) recommends the percentage of correctly predicted out-
comes as a measure of goodness of fit. In a binary response model, it is sufficient
to know whether the probability for one outcome is larger or smaller than 50 per-
cent. In an ordered logit regression with three possible outcomes, we might lose
some observations because it is possible that none reach this threshold. Hence,
we assume the value with the highest probability. Using the model of column
(c) in table 4, this approach yields 26,666 correct and 16,631 wrong predictions
(61.59% correctly predicted outcomes).
It is also interesting to see how good the single outcomes can be predicted.
The model predicts 300 mortgages with a maturity of 5 years, which is true for 137
mortgages (45.67%). 156 mortgages have a maturity of 10 years and 7 mortgages
have a maturity of 15 years. The prediction is best for mortgages with a maturity
of 10 years: 20,319 of 32,129 mortgages (63.24%) are correctly specified whereas
3,331 mortgages have a maturity of 5 years and 8,479 mortgages have a maturity
of 15 years. 10,868 mortgages are predicted to have a maturity of 15 years. This
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is true for 6,210 of them (57.14%). 102 mortgages have a maturity of 5 years and
4,556 have a maturity of 10 years. The results are also depicted in table 5.
[Insert table 5 here]
6.2 Influence of the macroeconomic environment
We can show that the macroeconomic environment has a weak but significant
influence on the maturity decision: In economically good times, borrowers pre-
fer shorter maturities. This is especially interesting since economic upswings
usually lead to interest rate increases and borrowers hence should choose longer
maturities.
[Insert table 6 here]
As column (a) in table 6 shows, an increase of the GDP growth by 1% leads
to a decrease in maturity of 0.03 years. While this is economically irrelevant, it
is highly statistically significant. The same is true for the ifo Business Climate
indicator which consists of business expectations and the current business situa-
tion (Table 6, column (b)). An increase of the indicator by 1 point decreases the
maturity by 0.02 years. A decrease of the unemployment rate by 1 percentage
point leads to a reduction of the maturity by 0.22 years (Table 6, column (c)).
Column (d) in table 6 shows that a higher inflation rate leads to longer matu-
rities. This is in line with the hypothesis mentioned above, namely that borrowers
anticipate an increase of the interest rate level and choose longer maturities be-
forehand. An increase of the inflation rate by 1 percentage point results in a
maturity increase of 0.11 years.
Since it might need some time until borrowers anticipate the macroeconomic
situation, we also use regressors lagged by three months and can not find a notable
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change (results not reported). The results of the ordered logit model in table 7
confirm our results.
[Insert table 7 here]
6.3 Rationality of mortgage borrowers
Solving a numerical life-cycle model, Campbell and Cocco (2003) find that “house-
holds with large houses relative to their income, volatile labor income, or high
risk aversion are particularly adversely affected by the income risk of an ARM”
(pp. 1452-3). In the German market, a long maturity reduces the income risk
which is defined as the “short-term variability in the real payments that are re-
quired each month.” (Campbell and Cocco (2003), p. 1452). We test in our study
whether the factors mentioned lead to a longer period of fixed interest rates in
reality. A further finding is that “for couples, an ARM delivers higher utility than
a nominal FRM everywhere in the utility distribution.” (p. 1472) We also test
whether couples, i.e. mortgages with a co-borrower or with a married borrower,
choose shorter periods of fixed interest rates. The results are depicted in table 8.
[Insert table 8 here]
An increase of the value to income ratio by 1 percentage point leads to a
significant maturity decrease of 0.10 years. This is contradictory to the advice
of Campbell and Cocco (2003). Borrowers whose houses are expensive relative
to their income might need higher mortgages. In order to keep the interest
payments low and overcome borrowing constraints, they are willing to accept a
shorter maturity.
In order to test the influence of income volatility, we form two groups. The
group “stable” contains all borrowers that are civil servants or retirees. Members
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of both groups do not face the threat of a layoff or significant salary cuts. By
contrast, the group “unstable” contains freelancers and self-employed individuals,
i.e. borrowers with an unsteady income stream. We find that borrowers with a
stable income choose a maturity which is 0.14 years longer than the maturity of
the remaining borrowers. However, borrowers with an unstable income choose
a maturity that is 0.47 years shorter than the maturity of the other borrowers.
This is in line with the results of Cutts et al. (2006) but once again a violation
of the recommendation in Campbell and Cocco (2003).
We find that a co-borrower leads to a maturity that is 0.36 years longer than
that of single borrowers. When the borrower is married, maturity increases by
0.13 years compared to unmarried borrowers. These results show that borrowers
do not make use of a reduced income risk which allows to take out mortgages
with a shorter maturity and hence lower interest rates.
In order to test the influence of risk aversion, we use gender as a proxy. We
remove all mortgages from the dataset that were taken out by a couple. We find
that men choose a slightly shorter maturity than do women. Since many studies
find that women are more risk averse than men,3 this finding is the only one
which is in line with the recommendation of Campbell and Cocco (2003).
The ordered logit regression in table 9 confirms our results.
[Insert table 9 here]
6.4 Influence of pricing variables
So far, all studies have shown the predominant influence of pricing variables.
A high interest rate spread induces borrowers to choose the cheaper mortgage
3For example, Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) write that “perhaps the best documented difference
between women and men is that women are more risk averse than men.” A literature review is
provided by Croson and Gneezy (2009).
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and the reaction on the interest rate levels allows the conclusion that borrowers
expect a mean reverting behavior of interest rates. Campbell and Cocco (2003)
also suggest “when [the] yield spread is unusually high, more homeowners should
take out ARMs, when it is unusually low, more homeowners should take out
FRMs.” (p. 1453)
We do find the well-studied maturity shortening influence of a higher interest
level and a higher spread as well (not reported). Additionally, thanks to the
large data set we can study whether different borrowers are affected differently
by pricing variables. We find that older people are less influenced by both the
yield spread and the general interest level. While borrowers in the 25 - 34 years
age group reduce the maturity by 2.96 years when the spread increases by 100
basis points, borrowers in the 65 - 74 years age group react by a reduction of 1.44
years only. There is a steady decrease over all age groups (cf. table 10). The
evidence is not so obvious for the influence of the general interest level. However,
one has to note that the regressors for the 25 - 34 years age group and the 35 -
44 years age group are close and the standard deviation for the 65 - 74 years age
group is high. Keeping this in mind, one also finds a decreasing influence of the
general interest level.
[Insert table 10 here]
6.5 Influence of the household decision rule
Households might try to forecast future short-term interest rates and compare
this prediction with current long-term interest rates when choosing the maturity
of their mortgage. The simplest guess is assuming constant interest rates. This
leads to the spread between current long-term interest rates and current short-
term interest rates. As mentioned in section 6.4, we find this effect for the spread
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between mortgages with a maturity of 15 years and mortgages with a maturity
of 5 years as well.
A more sophisticated approach compares the current long-term interest rates
with an average of recent short-term interest rates. This corresponds with the
household decision rule of Koijen et al. (2009) which equals the long-term bond
risk premium. With yt(T ) denoting the interest rate for a maturity of T years
at time t, we define the rule as κt(%) = yt(15) − 1%
∑%−1
u=0 yt−u(5) since 15 years is
the longest maturity available and 5 years is a very popular short-term maturity.
The look-back period % is 360 days or 1800 days, respectively, and is calculated
on a daily basis. The results are presented in table 11.
[Insert table 11 here]
We find that the household decision rule has a significant influence for both
% = 360 and % = 1800. Analogous to the influence of the spread, an increase of
the distance between long-term interest rates and the arithmetic mean of recent
short-term rates reduces the chosen maturity. This effect is more pronounced for
the longer look-back period where the reduction amounts to between one and two
and a half years compared to the shorter look-back period where the reduction
is less than one year.
Comparing these results with regression (1c) in table 2, we find that adding
the household decision rule with % = 360 to the explaining variables leads to a
small increase of the adjusted R2 only. The rise from 18.15 to 18.18 indicates no
additional explanatory power. However, for % = 1800 the household decision rule
leads to an increase from 18.15 to 19.47 in adjusted R2. This shows that it needs
to be considered when explaining the chosen maturity. In a nutshell, we confirm
the findings of Koijen et al. (2009) on the importance of the household decision
rule provided that the look back period is long enough.
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7 Conclusion
In this study, we were able to show that personal characteristics do have an
influence on the mortgage choice. A high income, a low loan value, and a low loan
to value ratio reduce the chosen maturity. When a mortgage is renewed, shorter
maturities are preferred. Non-German borrowers choose also shorter maturities.
The number of children in the borrower’s household has no economic significant
impact. The influence of the borrower’s age has been controversial. We find that
it is a variable which is complicated to handle but leads to shorter periods of
fixed interest for older people. Due to its quadratic behavior, the impact is low
for borrowers of average age and high for comparably older people. This might
be a reason why the relation has not been found in earlier studies with smaller
sample size. Additionally, how strongly a borrower reacts to pricing variables
depends on the borrower’s age. We were also able to show that the household
decision rule proposed by Koijen et al. (2009) matters provided the look back
period is long enough.
We can also show that the economy also influences mortgage choice. During
an economic upswing, which is characterized by a high GDP growth, a good
business climate, and a low unemployment rate, maturities are shortened. A
higher inflation rate leads to longer maturities.
It is interesting to see that the predictions of the model in Campbell and
Cocco (2003) are rarely fulfilled. A co-borrower or marriage as well as a low
value to income ratio increase the chosen maturity. This is as irrational as the
finding of a longer maturity for borrowers with a stable income and a shorter
maturity for borrowers with an unstable income. The only prediction that we
can confirm is a shorter maturity for borrower with a lower risk aversion when
using gender as a proxy. Investigating if borrowers with a higher financial literacy
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behave more rational and if other proxies for risk aversion yield the same result
remains a direction for further research.
The lessons from these results are twofold: On the one hand, banks can use
our findings on the influence of personal factors for a more profitable pricing of
their loans. On the other hand, we showed that borrowers need more support
when choosing the mortgage in order to come to a more rational decision.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the
regressors.
Standard
Mean Median deviation Minimum Maximum N
Maturity (years) 11.08 10.00 3.02 1.00 15.00 52,148
General Interest Level (%) 4.31 4.25 0.43 3.50 5.45 52,148
Spread (%) 0.66 0.70 0.39 0.00 1.30 52,148
Income (EUR) 3,980 3,290 4,020 769 189,700 52,148
Age (years) 41.88 40.00 10.46 17.00 94.00 52,148
Number of Children 0.87 1.00 0.98 0.00 9.00 52,148
Loan to Value Ratio 0.70 0.73 0.20 0.05 1.00 52,148
Loan Value (EUR) 164,700 150,000 109,800 12,000 7,847,000 52,148
Foreigner (dummy) 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 52,148
Broker (dummy) 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 52,148
Renewal (dummy) 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 52,148
Not Self-occupied (dummy) 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 52,148
GDP Growth (%) 0.98 1.65 3.01 -6.62 4.51 52,148
Ifo Business Climate (points, 2005 = 100) 98.30 99.70 7.34 82.30 108.80 52,148
Unemployment Rate (%) 9.40 8.70 1.66 7.10 12.70 52,148
Inflation Rate (%) 1.56 1.52 0.89 -0.46 3.28 52,148
House Price to Income Ratio 4.88 4.65 2.35 0.04 39.45 52,148
Stable Income (dummy) 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 52,148
Unstable Income (dummy) 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 52,148
Co-Borrower (dummy) 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 52,148
Marriage (dummy) 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 52,148
Man (dummy) 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 52,148
Woman (dummy) 0.10 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 52,148
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Table 2: OLS regression: Personal regressors
This table presents the OLS regression coefficients and standard deviations of
chosen maturity on various independent variables. The pricing factors include the
general interest level and the spread between 15- and 5-year interest rates. ***,
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the variable
has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
(1a) (1b) (1c)
log(Income) -0.63 -0.55 -0.67
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
log(Loan Value) 0.70 0.65 0.70
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Loan to Value Ratio 0.72 0.62 0.72
(0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)***
Renewal -0.63 -0.59 -0.65
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Foreigner -0.74 -0.72 -0.73
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Number of Children 0.03 0.03 0.01
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)
Not Owner-occupied -0.36 -0.35 -0.30
(0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)***
Age -0.04 -0.04 0.02
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)**
Age2 - - -0.000 63
- - (0.000 08)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes
Broker yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no yes no
dem(Loan to Value Ratio) · Renewal yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Not Owner-occupied yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) · dem(log(Income)) yes yes yes
Intercept 15.22 11.90 14.18
(0.35)*** (0.40)*** (0.38)***
Adj −R2 18.06 19.72 18.15
N 52,148 52,148 52,148
27
Table 3: Influence of income
This table presents the OLS regression coefficients and standard deviations
of chosen maturity on various independent variables for five different income
groups. The pricing factors include the general interest level and the spread
between 15- and 5-year interest rates. The personal factors include age, squared
age, number of children, loan to value ratio, loan value, owner-occupation,
foreigner, broker, and renewal. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We denote the natural logarithm by log
and indicate with dem that the variable has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic
mean has been subtracted.
-2499 EUR 2500-3499 EUR 3500-4499 EUR 4500-5499 EUR 5500+ EUR
Loan to Value Ratio 0.11 0.22 1.45 1.59 2.51
(0.14) (0.14)* (0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.30)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes yes yes
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) ·
dem(log(Income))
yes yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio ·
Not Owner-occupied
yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no no
Intercept 9.54 9.04 8.80 10.94 11.24
(0.79)*** (1.02)*** (1.53)*** (1.21)*** (1.63)***
Adj −R2 14.24 17.39 19.82 20.66 15.12
N 12,308 16,917 10,520 5,482 6,921
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Table 4: Ordered logit regression: Personal regressors
This table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients and standard devia-
tions of chosen maturity on various independent variables. The pricing factors
include the general interest level and the spread between 15- and 5-year interest
rates. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that
the variable has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
(1a) (1b) (1c)
log(Income) -0.39 -0.34 -0.40
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)***
log(Loan Value) 0.65 0.64 0.65
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Loan to Value Ratio 0.12 0.02 0.11
(0.07)* (0.07) (0.01)***
Renewal -0.56 -0.53 -0.57
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Foreigner -0.57 -0.57 -0.56
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.00)***
Number of Children 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Not Owner-occupied -0.52 -0.53 -0.49
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.02)***
Age -0.03 -0.03 -
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** -
Age2 - - -0.000 29
- - (0.000 01)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes
Broker yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no yes no
dem(Loan to Value Ratio)
· Renewal
yes yes yes






AIC 68,178 67,210 68,106
N 43,297 43,297 43,297
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Table 5: Ordered logit regression: Goodness of fit
This table presents how good an ordered logit model predicts the chosen maturity.
For example, the first line shows that 300 mortgages are predicted to have a
maturity of 5 years. This is true in 137 cases. 156 have an actual maturity of 10
years and 7 have an actual maturity of 15 years.
Actual chosen maturity
5 years 10 years 15 years total
5 years predicted 137 156 7 300
10 years predicted 3,331 20,319 8,479 32,129
15 years predicted 102 4,556 6,210 10,868
total 3,570 25,031 14,696 43,297
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Table 6: OLS regression: Macroeconomic regressors
This table presents the OLS regression coefficients and standard deviations of
chosen maturity on various independent variables. The pricing factors include
the general interest level and the spread between 15- and 5-year interest rates.
The personal factors include income, age, squared age, number of children, loan
to value ratio, loan value, owner-occupation, foreigner, broker, and renewal. ***,
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the variable
has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
GDP Growth -0.03 - - -
(0.01)*** - - -
Ifo Business Climate - -0.02 - -
- (0.00)*** - -
Unemployment Rate - - 0.22 -
- - (0.01)*** -
Inflation - - - 0.11
- - - (0.02)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes yes
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Renewal yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Not Owner-occupied yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) · dem(log(Income)) yes yes yes yes
dem(GDP Growth) · dem(Spread) yes no no no
dem(Ifo Business Climate) · dem(Spread) no yes no no
dem(Unemployment Rate) · dem(Spread) no no yes no
dem(Inflation) · dem(Spread) no no no yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no
Intercept 15.20 17.24 9.09 10.82
(0.39)*** (0.47)*** (0.42)*** (0.43)***
Adj −R2 18.26 18.37 19.49 18.57
N 52,148 52,148 52,148 52,148
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Table 7: Ordered logit regression: Macroeconomic regressors
This table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients and standard devia-
tions of chosen maturity on various independent variables. The pricing factors
include the general interest level and the spread between 15- and 5-year interest
rates. The personal factors include income, squared age, number of children, loan
to value ratio, loan value, owner-occupation, foreigner, broker, and renewal. ***,
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the variable
has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
GDP Growth -0.01 - - -
(0.00)*** - - -
Ifo Business Climate - -0.01 - -
- (0.00)*** - -
Unemployment Rate - - 0.17 -
- - (0.01)*** -
Inflation - - - 0.11
- - - (0.02)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes yes
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Renewal yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Not Owner-occupied yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) · dem(log(Income)) yes yes yes yes
dem(GDP Growth) · dem(Spread) yes no no no
dem(Ifo Business Climate) · dem(Spread) no yes no no
dem(Unemployment Rate) · dem(Spread) no no yes no
dem(Inflation) · dem(Spread) no no no yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no
AIC 68,051 67,973 67,346 67,837
N 43,297 43,297 43,297 43,297
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Table 8: OLS regression: Campbell/Cocco regressors
This table presents the OLS regression coefficients and standard deviations of
chosen maturity on various independent variables. The pricing factors include
the general interest level and the spread between 15- and 5-year interest rates.
The personal factors include income, age, squared age, number of children, loan
to value ratio, loan value, owner-occupation, foreigner, broker, and renewal.
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem
that the variable has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e) (4f)
House Price to Income Ratio -0.10 - - - - -
(0.01)*** - - - - -
Stable Income - 0.14 - - - -
- (0.04)*** - - - -
Unstable Income - - -0.47 - - -
- - (0.06)*** - - -
Co-borrower - - - 0.36 - -
- - - (0.03)*** - -
Married - - - - 0.13 -
- - - - (0.03)*** -
Man - - - - - -0.15
- - - - - (0.05)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) ·
dem(log(Income))
yes yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Value Income Ratio))
· dem(Income)
yes no no no no no
Loan to Value Ratio · Not
Owner-occupied
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no no no
Intercept 13.94 14.25 13.78 14.73 14.34 14.434
(0.38)*** (0.38)*** (0.38)*** (0.38)*** (0.38)*** (0.689)***
Adj −R2 18.22 18.16 18.25 18.37 18.18 16.71
N 52,148 52,148 52,148 52,148 52,148 13,305
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Table 9: Ordered logit regression: Campbell/Cocco regressors
This table presents the ordered logit regression coefficients and standard devia-
tions of chosen maturity on various independent variables. The pricing factors
include the general interest level and the spread between 15- and 5-year interest
rates. The personal factors include income, squared age, number of children, loan
to value ratio, loan value, owner-occupation, foreigner, broker, and renewal. ***,
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the variable
has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e) (4f)
House Price to Income Ratio -0.08 - - - - -
(0.01)*** - - - - -
Stable Income - 0.14 - - - -
- (0.03)*** - - - -
Unstable Income - - -0.42 - - -
- - (0.01)*** - - -
Co-borrower - - - 0.26 - -
- - - (0.02)*** - -
Married - - - - 0.09 -
- - - - (0.02)*** -
Man - - - - - -0.14
- - - - - (0.04)***
Controlling for:
Pricing Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) ·
dem(log(Income))
yes yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Value Income Ratio))
· dem(Income)
yes no no no no no
Loan to Value Ratio · Not
Owner-occupied
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no no no
AIC 68,025 68,060 68,001 67,969 68,062 18,818
N 43,297 43,297 43,297 43,297 43,297 11,447
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Table 10: Influence of age
This table presents the OLS regression coefficients and standard deviations of
chosen maturity on various independent variables for five different age groups.
The personal factors include income, number of children, loan to value ratio,
loan value, owner-occupation, foreigner, broker, and renewal. ***, **, * indicates
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We denote
the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the variable has been
demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
25-34 yrs 35-44 yrs 45-54 yrs 55-64 yrs 65-74 yrs
General Interest Level -1.17 -1.21 -0.98 -0.90 -1.03
(0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.14)*** (0.21)***
Spread -2.96 -2.75 -1.97 -1.46 -1.44
(0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.15)*** (0.22)***
Controlling for:
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) · dem(log(Income)) yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(House Price to Income Ratio)) ·
dem(Income)
yes yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Not Owner-occupied yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no no
Intercept 12.48 15.69 14.25 11.94 12.07
(0.69)*** (0.58)*** (0.75)*** (1.26)*** (1.76)***
Adj −R2 13.51 14.93 13.12 9.55 10.64
N 12,755 20,978 11,347 4,449 1,671
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Table 11: OLS regression: household decision rule
This table presents the OLS regression coefficients and standard deviations of
chosen maturity on the household decision rule κt(%) and various control variables.
The personal factors include income, age, squared age, number of children, loan
to value ratio, loan value, owner-occupation, foreigner, broker, and renewal. ***,
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We denote the natural logarithm by log and indicate with dem that the variable
has been demeaned, i.e. its arithmetic mean has been subtracted.
% 360 360 360 1800 1800 1800
κt(%, 15) -0.18 -0.72 -0.33 -1.52 -2.48 -1.00
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)***
Controlling for:
General Interest Level yes yes no yes yes no
Spread yes no yes yes no yes
Personal Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes
dem(Loan to Value Ratio) ·
Renewal
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Loan to Value Ratio · Not
Owner-occupied
yes yes yes yes yes yes
dem(log(Loan Value)) ·
dem(log(Income))
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects no no no no no no
Adj −R2 18.18 13.26 16.93 19.47 17.42 19.26
N 52,148 52,148 52,148 52,148 52,148 52,148
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